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We propose a model where investors hire fund managers to invest either in risky bonds or in riskless
assets. Some managers have superior information on the default probability. Looking at the past performance,
investors update beliefs on their managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns
which affect investment decisions, generating a positive or negative "reputational premium". For example,
when the default probability is high, uninformed managers prefer to invest in riskless assets to reduce
the probability of being fired. As the economic and financial conditions change, the reputational premium
amplifies the reaction of prices and capital flows.
Veronica Guerrieri
University of Chicago
Booth School of Business











The ￿nancial turmoil started in the summer of 2007 and exploded in 2008 has costly testi￿ed
that the incentives of ￿nancial intermediaries and the performance of the economy are closely
related. In this paper, we provide a general equilibrium model of the interaction between
investors, ￿nancial intermediaries and the users of capital. In particular, we focus on the
career concerns of fund managers who take into account the e⁄ect of their portfolio choices
on the probability of being ￿red. We show that career concerns can magnify the reaction of
asset prices and capital ￿ ows to both real and ￿nancial shocks.
Although our model can be applied to any risky asset, in this paper we focus on debt
instruments. In the few years before the recent subprime crises, many market observers were
concerned about a growing ￿overenthusiasm￿ for risky investments in debt instruments,
including high-yield corporate bonds, mortgage-backed assets and emerging market bonds.
One observer notices:
Bonds issued by Ecuador, which is politically very unstable, are among the riskiest
bets in the emerging markets. It is hard to predict what will happen there next month,
let alone in 10 years time. Yet buyers appear to be ready and willing to line up for a
sale by the government of up to Dollars 750m in 10-years bonds, the ￿rst international
bond o⁄er since the country defaulted in 1999. The issue, [...] is the latest example
that the prolonged love a⁄air with emerging market debt is far from over. (December
9, 2005, Financial Times).
A similar observation related to the role of ￿nancial intermediaries in the leveraged buy-
out deals follows:
The head of one of the biggest commercial lenders in the US describes the amount
of leverage on some buy-out deals as ￿nutty￿ . Much of the wildest lending is being
done by hedge funds awash with cash, he says. ￿Some funds believe they have to invest
the money even if it￿ s not a smart investment. They think the people that gave them
the money expect them to invest it. But it￿ s madness.￿(March 14, 2005, Financial
Times)
Figure 1 shows the pattern of the yield spreads of a sample of emerging market bonds, the
AAA and the B-graded corporate bonds, and the investment graded commercial mortgage-
backed assets, between October 1994 and October 2008. The ￿gure shows at least two
periods in which all spreads shrunk to very low levels, close to the AAA corporate spreads:
in 1996-1997 and then again from 2005 to the summer of 2007. Observers describe these
2Figure 1: The JPMorgan EMBI+ spread for Asia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mexico, Peru, the yield
spread of AAA corporate bonds and an index of the yield spread of B-graded corporate
bonds and investment graded comercial mortgage-backed assets between October 1994 and
April 2009. Source: Datastream, St. Louis Fed.
periods as periods of overenthusiasm, which typically occur right before the emergence of
a crisis (e.g. Kamin and von Kleist, 1999, Du¢ e et al., 2003). The ￿gure also shows at
least four episodes of high turbulence in which the spreads of many high-risk bonds jump up
and capital tends to ￿ ow out of these markets, a phenomenon dubbed as ￿ ight-to-liquidity
or ￿ ight-to-quality. Our model is able to rationalize both episodes of overenthusiasm and
episodes of ￿ ight-to-liquidity.
We propose a model where investors delegate their portfolio decision to risk-neutral fund
managers. We assume that fund managers can invest either in risk-less assets or in risky
bonds, and di⁄er in the degree of information about the default risk. The core of our model
builds on the career concerns of the fund managers. Every period, each investor has a
manager working for him. We consider an extreme environment, where a small portion of
informed managers can perfectly predict if the risky bond is going to default, and a mass of
uninformed managers know only the ex ante default probability. At the end of the period,
the investor updates his belief based on his manager￿ s performance, and decides whether to
keep him or to hire a new one. The investors￿￿ring decision distorts the investment decision
3of uninformed managers who would like to be perceived as informed managers.
One of our main result is that managers￿career concerns impose a premium on the
price of risky bonds, which may be positive or negative depending on the default probability.
Uninformed fund managers try to time the market in order to behave as if they were informed
and knew in advance if there would be default or not. Default hurts the reputation of
uninformed managers who invest in the risky bond, and no default hurts the reputation of
uninformed managers who invest in the riskless asset. Thus, when the probability of default
is high, the premium for investing in the risky bond is positive to compensate for the risk
of being ￿red. When instead the default probability is low, the risky bond will trade at
a negative premium. A shock either to the ex ante default probability or to the ￿nancial
market, such as a change in the risk-free rate, may generate a switch in the sign of the
premium. This tends to amplify the reaction of the bond price to the shock, in comparison
to an economy with no career concerns.
We then consider an extended version of the model where we endogenize the supply of
risky bonds and the default rule. In particular, we introduce a continuum of entrepreneurs
who have access to a risky project and can issue risky bonds. They take the bond price
as given and choose how much to borrow in order to cover their consumption and ￿nance
their project. After observing the realization of the project￿ s productivity, they can decide
whether to pay back the outstanding debt or to default and su⁄er a loss. The interaction
between managers and entrepreneurs determines the price of the risky bond, the probability
of default and the volume of debt in the economy. The investment choice of the managers
determines the required bond price for a given probability of default. The default rule of the
entrepreneurs determines the bond￿ s ex ante probability of default for a given price. Hence,
the equilibrium bond price and the default probability are jointly determined by the ￿nancial
market and the fundamentals of the risky project.
We show that, once we endogenize the supply side of the model, there is a feedback e⁄ect
from asset pricing to the real economy, which magni￿es further the reaction of prices and
capital ￿ ows to ￿nancial and real shocks. On the ￿nancial side, a higher default probability
leads to a lower bond price, also because of a larger premium. On the real side, when
borrowing is more expensive, entrepreneurs have to make larger repayments and, hence,
default with higher probability. In general equilibrium, these two mechanisms reinforce each
other and generate excess volatility in bond prices.
Literature review. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to show that imperfect
information about fund mangers￿skills leads to ampli￿cation of shocks, counter-cyclical
premium on risky assets and volatile asset prices. Our work is related to several areas of
macroeconomics and ￿nance.
4First, our paper is related to herding models, such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zweibel
(1995), and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006), where, as in our paper, decision makers with
career concerns make ine¢ cient decisions to convince their clients that they are informed.
However, there are two main di⁄erences with our work. On the one hand, this literature
traditionally concentrates on partial equilibrium models while our focus is on the interaction
of career concerns and asset prices. On the other hand, these papers present mechanisms in
which each decision maker herds on others￿decision because going against the average action
is a bad signal about his ability. In our model, at the equilibrium prices, fund managers
choose the ine¢ cient action regardless of other managers￿decision. That is, there are no
strategic complementarities. The closest paper to ours is Rajan (1994), who shows that
herding might motivate bank executives to overextend credit in good times by amplifying
real shocks. In contrast to our model, Rajan (1994) predicts that in bad times banks provide
the right amount of credit while we argue that in bad times managers underinvest in the
risky bonds.
Second, there is a growing literature which analyzes the e⁄ect of delegated portfolio
management on asset prices, including Allen and Gorton (1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Vayanos (2003), Cuoco and Kaniel (2007), He and Krishnamurthy (2008). Unlike our work,
most of this literature takes managers￿distorted incentives as given. A notable exception is
Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008) and Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2008) who introduce herd-
ing into a Glosten-Milgrom type of sequential trading model. They show that reputational
concerns can lead to excessive trading, slow revelation of information and (if the market
maker has market power) biased prices. They are the ￿rst to use the term reputational pre-
mium and to point out that the potential trade-o⁄ between reputation and trading pro￿ts
might lead managers to choose bets with negative net present value. However, we have a
di⁄erent focus. We are interested in how career concerns amplify the response of price and
capital ￿ ows to ￿nancial and real shocks. In particular, we build a standard, competitive,
asset pricing model to show that career concerns have systematic e⁄ects on prices.
Our paper is also related to a large literature on the propagation and ampli￿cation of
fundamental shocks due to the interaction between asset values and collateralized lending.
Seminal papers in this area are Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
on the macro-side, and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) on the ￿nance side1. The main di⁄erence
with our mechanism is that these papers have typically an asymmetric distortion, given that
collateral constraints build into the model an external ￿nance premium, usually generating
1See also Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999), Rampini (2003), Krishnamurthy (2003), Gai, Kondor and
Vause (2005), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2008) on the macro side and Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2004),
Morris and Shin (2004), Bernardo and Welch (2004) on the ￿nance side.
5underinvestment. In our model, instead, we microfound the ￿nancial distortion and we
generate a premium that can be either positive or negative.
Finally, our model can be naturally interpreted as a model of sovereign debt. In this
sense is related to the vast literature on ￿nancial crisis in emerging economies and reversal of
capital ￿ ows, including Atkenson (1991), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Calvo and Mendoza (2000),
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Benczur and Ilut (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
Uribe and Yue (2006), and Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007), Arellano (2008). This strand of
literature abstracts from the e⁄ects of intermediation in ￿nancial markets, and could be
interestingly complemented with our mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce an example
to illustrate the main mechanism of our model. In Section 3, we describe the model, and
de￿ne and characterize an equilibrium. In Section 4, we analyze an extended version of the
model, where the supply of risky bonds and the default decision are endogenous. In Section
5, we analyze an economy where productivity is persistent and we propose some numerical
exercises. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The Appendix includes all the proofs which are not
in the text.
2 An Example
In this section, we introduce a simple example to show the main mechanism of the model,
that is, how prices may be distorted by an incentive scheme which rewards successful fund
managers over and above the returns of their investment.
Assume that a large group of risk-neutral fund managers have to decide whether to invest
a unit of capital in a risky asset or in a riskless asset. The risky asset has price p and pays 1
if the good state realizes and 0 if the bad state realizes. The probability of the bad state is
equal to q. The riskless asset pays the safe return R < 1=p. Just for this example, assume
that a manager obtains a bonus W if he succeeds in his investment, that is, if he invests in
the risky bond when there is no default or in the riskless asset otherwise. The riskless asset
is in in￿nite supply, while the supply of the risky bond is ￿xed and smaller than the total
capital invested by the managers.
It is straightforward that the bond market clears if and only if managers are indi⁄erent
between investing in the risky bond and in the riskless asset. Hence, the equilibrium price
of the risky bond has to satisfy the following indi⁄erence condition
(1 ￿ q)(1=p + W) = R + qW: (1)
6The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the expected payo⁄of a manager who invests in
the risky bond. With probability 1￿q there is no default and the manager gets a return 1=p
and the bonus W. If instead there is default, the manager gets zero revenues and no bonus.
Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (1) represents the expected payo⁄ of a manager
who invests in the riskless asset. He gets always a return R, but he obtains the bonus only
if there is default.2
In order to characterize the price distortion generated by the bonus W, we de￿ne the





The indi⁄erence condition (1) immediately implies that ￿ = 0 when there is no bonus
scheme, that is, W = 0. In this case, fund managers care only about the expected returns
of the bond and the premium is zero. When instead W > 0, the premium can be negative
or positive. In particular, if q > 1=2, the payo⁄of the risky bond is skewed to the left as the
probability of default is larger than the probability of no default. In this case, investing in
the riskless asset has an advantage over the risky bond as this ensures the bonus payment
with larger probability. If the expected return of the two assets were equal, all managers
would prefer the riskless one, because of this advantage. Thus, in equilibrium there must be
a positive premium on the risky bond to induce managers to hold it. Similarly, if q < 1=2 the
payo⁄of the risky bond is skewed to the right. In this case, the risky bond has an advantage
and the premium is negative.
This simple example is suggestive, but it clearly calls for some microfundations behind
the bonus scheme. Why investors should ex post reward managers who make successful
investment? The story we have in mind is a story of career concerns, which needs both
a dynamic environment and some form of heterogeneous information. In the rest of the
paper we build a dynamic general equilibrium model of delegated portfolio management
with informed and uninformed managers. Investors rationally learn about the type of the
fund managers based on their past performance. Uninformed managers￿career concerns
generate a reputational premium similar to the one described in this example. In particular,
W becomes an equilibrium object equal to the continuation utility of an employed uninformed
manager. We show that small shocks to the ￿nancial market or to the fundamentals of the
risky project may lead to large changes in asset prices and capital ￿ ows, due to the presence
of the reputational premium. In Section 4, we also endogenize the default probability q and
the supply of the risky bond. We introduce entrepreneurs who issue the risky bond and can
2The equlibrium price is consistent with the assumption that 1=p > R if R > W (1 ￿ 2q)=q.
7decide to default on their loans. This generates a feed-back e⁄ect from asset pricing to the
real economy, which further magni￿es the reaction of prices to shocks.
3 Baseline Model
3.1 Set up
Consider an in￿nite horizon economy with discrete time. There is a mass ￿ of risk-neutral
investors and two investment possibilities: a riskless asset, in in￿nite supply, which pays R
units of consumption per unit of capital invested, and a risky bond with ￿xed supply b and
price in terms of capital pt, which pays 1 unit of consumption if there is no default and 0
otherwise. Let ￿t+1 denote the default indicator such that ￿t+1 = 1 if there is default and




is equal to q.
At any time t, each investor has one unit of capital and needs a fund manager to invest
it. There are two types of risk-neutral fund managers: informed and uninformed.3 Informed
managers know in advance ￿t+1, that is, they can perfectly predict if there is going to be
default.4 Uninformed managers, instead, expect the bond to default with probability q.
There is a mass MI of informed managers and a larger continuum of uninformed managers.
Fund managers do not have any capital, and need to be employed by an investor to make any
investment decision. Each investor can employ only one fund manager and a fund manager
can work only for a single investor. Moreover, investors do not know the managers￿type.
At time t there is a mass ￿s
t of employed managers of type s, and all investors have a
manager working for them, so that ￿I
t + ￿U
t = ￿. Then, employed managers choose how to
invest the unit of capital they manage. Next, investors observe the return of their manager￿ s
investment and decide whether to ￿re him or not. Moreover, they receive a signal that
reveals the type of an uninformed manager with probability 1 ￿ !.5 Each manager has a
probability 1 ￿ ￿ to die, in which case a new manager of the same type is born. Finally, all
investors who do not have a manager, either because they have ￿red him or because he is
dead, search for a new one. At the same time, the unemployed managers decide whether to
pay a cost ￿ to search for a job. Let Ns
t be the mass of managers of type s, with s = I;U,
who decide to look for a job. The probability for a manager to ￿nd a job, denoted by ￿t, is
3Risk neutrality ensures that the demand for the risky bond is perfectly elastic, making the model more
tractable. Moreover, it allows us to focus on the premium on risky assets coming exclusively from career
concerns and not from risk.
4The extreme assumption that informed managers have perfect information is not crucial for the analysis.
However, it allows not to keep track of the history of beliefs, making the model more tractable.
5As we will discuss later on, this exogenous signal makes the analysis more tractable because it guarantees
that we can focus on equilibria where a manager who does succeed in his investment is never ￿red.
8equal to the ratio of the mass of investors searching for a manager to the mass of managers
searching for a job.6
We look for a stationary equilibrium where the mass of informed and uninformed em-
ployed managers, ￿I
t and ￿U
t , and the matching probability, ￿t, are constant over time.
Hence, from now on we can drop the time dependence for these objects. Moreover, for
simplicity, we ￿x the contract between investors and fund managers: fund managers keep
a share ￿ ￿ ￿=R of the revenues and leave the rest to the investors.7 Both investors and
managers fully consume their net revenues in each period.
Any employed manager selects a demand schedule dI ￿
pt;￿t+1
￿
2 [0;1] if he is informed
and dU (pt) 2 [0;1] if he is uninformed. At the same time, there is a mass yt of noise
traders, with one dollar each, who demand the bond, where yt is a random variable uniformly
distributed on the support [0; ￿ y], with ￿ y 2 [MI;b]. After collecting all the demand schedules,
an auctioneer selects the equilibrium price pt and assigns the risky bonds to the managers
and the noise traders. The selected price and bond allocation must be consistent with the
submitted demand schedules and with the bond market clearing. Let us denote by xI
t and
xU
t the equilibrium fraction of informed and uniformed managers who obtain the bond. The







t + yt = ptb: (2)
The right-hand side of the market clearing condition represents the value of the supply of
bonds. The left-hand side, instead, represents the demand of bonds, which comes from three
di⁄erent sources: 1) a proportion xI
t of informed employed managers, 2) a proportion xU
t of
uninformed employed managers, and 3) a mass yt of noise traders.
At the beginning of time t, each investor has a manager j working for him that he believes




t be an indicator variable, which is 1 if manager j is
allocated a unit of the risky bond, and 0 otherwise. A law of large number ensures that xs
t
represents also the probability for an agent of type s of receiving the risky bond. At the end
of time t, the investor observes ￿
j
t, gets his share of the realized returns, and learn whether
there has been default or not. Moreover, if his manager is uninformed, he discovers his type
with probability 1 ￿ !. Then, according to the Bayes￿Rule, he updates his belief about
the type of his manager to ￿
j
t+1. Conditional on his posterior, he chooses his ￿ring strategy
￿(￿
j
t+1), that is, whether to keep his manager for next period (￿(￿
j
t+1) = 0), or to ￿re him
and hire a new one (￿(￿
j
t+1) = 1). Clearly, the investor￿ s ￿ring decision is a⁄ected by the
6The job search structure guarantees the existence of a stationary equlibrium.
7The assumption that ￿ ￿ ￿R is su¢ cient to ensure that it is pro￿table for an informed manager to
search for a job.
9probability that a new hire is informed. The key feature of our model is that manager j
knows that his investment decision will a⁄ect the investors￿￿ring decision by changing his
posterior belief. This generates career concerns a⁄ecting the investment strategy that are at
the core of our model.
3.2 Equilibrium
Let us ￿rst introduce the de￿nition of a stationary equilibrium for any MI > 0. Next, we will
propose the type of stationary equilibrium we are interested in, an interior equilibrium, we
will characterize it, and show under which assumptions it exists. Finally, we will explore the
limit of an interior equilibrium as MI ! 0, which is a very tractable and insightful special
case.
De￿nition 1 For a given MI > 0, a stationary equilibrium is a demand schedule for in-
formed managers, dI(pt;￿t+1), a demand schedule for uninformed managers, dU(pt),a ￿ring
strategy for investors, ￿(￿
j
t+1), bond allocations for the informed and uninformed managers,
xI(￿t+1;yt) and xU(￿t+1;yt), a price p(￿t+1;yt), a constant mass of employed informed and








1. investors maximize their expected utility, taking as given equilibrium price, allocation
and strategies of other agents;
2. fund managers maximize their expected utility, taking as given equilibrium price, allo-
cation and strategies of other agents;
3. bond price and allocations are consistent with the managers￿demand schedules and
with market clearing;
4. ￿I, ￿U and ￿ are consistent with free entry in the labor market for fund managers;
5. investors￿beliefs are consistent with Bayes￿rule.
3.3 Interior Equilibrium
When MI > 0, employed uninformed managers face the risk of being ￿red and, hence,
their investment decisions are a⁄ected by their expected future utility. Moreover, they can
potentially extract some information about the strategy of the informed managers from
the equilibrium price. We focus on equilibria where uninformed managers are typically the
10marginal traders, that is, are indi⁄erent between investing in the bond and in the risk-free
asset whenever prices are not fully revealing. We call this type of equilibrium, an ￿interior￿
equilibrium. Let z represent the total potential demand of informed managers and noise










yt=b if z(￿t+1;yt) 2 [0;￿I)
p￿ if z(￿t+1;yt) 2 [￿I; ￿ y]
1=R if z(￿t+1;yt) 2 (￿ y; ￿ y + ￿I]
; (3)
with p￿ 2 (y=b;1=R);




1 ￿ ￿t+1 if pt < 1=R





0 if pt ￿ y=b
f0;1g if pt 2 (y=b;1=R]
;




1 ￿ ￿t+1 if z(￿t+1;yt) 2 [0; ￿ y]
b=R￿yt







0 if z(￿t+1;yt) 2 [0;￿I)
p￿b￿z(￿t+1;yt)
￿￿￿I if z(￿t+1;yt) 2 [￿I; ￿ y]
b=R￿yt
￿ if z(￿t+1;yt) 2 (￿ y; ￿ y + ￿I]
; (4)
(iv) investors￿￿ring rule requires to ￿re manager j if the exogenous signal reveals that j is
uninformed or ￿
j
t 6= 1 ￿ ￿t+1 and p(￿t+1;yt) < 1=R, and keep him otherwise.
An interior equilibrium is characterized by a mass ￿I of employed informed managers
and an interior price p￿, which ensure that conditions (i)-(iv) characterize a stationary equi-
librium. In particular, ￿I must be consistent with free entry in the labor market for fund
managers, while p￿ must be such that the uninformed managers are indi⁄erent between de-
manding the risky asset and the risk-free one when their only information is the ex-ante
probability of default q.
11In an interior equilibrium, three possible revelation regimes arise: p(￿t+1;yt) = 1=R re-
veals that there is going to be default, p(￿t+1;yt) = y=b reveals that there is going to be
no default, and, thanks to the uniform distribution of y, p(￿t+1;yt) = p￿ does not reveal
any information. If p(￿t+1;yt) = 1=R, the two assets are equivalent and all managers are
indi⁄erent between them. If p(￿t+1;yt) = y=b, there is revelation of default and all man-
agers demand the riskless asset. Finally, when p(￿t+1;yt) = p￿, informed managers know in
advance if there is going to be default or not, and hence can time the market perfectly, by
demanding the risky bond if and only if there is not going to be default. The uninformed
managers, however, do not have this superior information and p￿ makes them indi⁄erent be-
tween obtaining the bond or not. This is the notion of interior solution we refer to when we
call this equilibrium an interior equilibrium. It follows that ￿I=￿ y represents the probability
that in equilibrium the price is fully revealing. The assumption that ￿ y > MI ensures that
prices are not always fully revealing, that is, ￿I=￿ y < 1. According to the demand schedules,
the auctioneer determines the fraction of uninformed and informed managers who obtain the
bond in order to guarantee that the bond market clears. Finally, investors ￿re their manager
whenever they have an exogenous signal that he is uninformed and, if p(￿t+1;yt) < 1=R,
when their manager makes an unsuccessful investment.
In equilibrium, the values of ￿I and p￿ are jointly determined with the values of the
expected utility of an employed uninformed manager, W, and the probability that an un-
employed manager ￿nds a job, ￿. In particular, ￿I must be such that the mass of employed
informed managers stay constant after ￿ of them die and ￿ of the unemployed ones are hired,









Due to free entry, uninformed managers looking for a job get zero ex ante expected utility,
that is,
￿W ￿ ￿ = 0; (6)
while the expected utility of an employed uninformed manager W satis￿es
W = ￿R + ￿!
￿
￿






When the price is fully revealing, with probability ￿I=￿ y, an uninformed manager always
gains ￿R, given that if he learns that there is default he invests in the risk-free asset, while
if he learns that there is no default, the bond price will be equal to 1=R. Moreover, he is
never ￿red and gets the continuation utility W, as long as he does not die and there is no
exogenous signal. When instead the price does not reveal any information, with probability
121 ￿ ￿I=￿ y, uninformed managers are indi⁄erent in each point in time between investing in
the risk-free asset or in the risky bond, and hence their expected utility can be calculated as
the value of always investing in the risk-free asset. Again, they will always gain ￿R, but, in
this case, they will get the continuation utility W only if there is default, with probability
q, no exogenous signal, with probability !, and no death, with probability ￿. Finally, the
indi⁄erence condition for an uninformed manager is given by
(1 ￿ q)(￿=p
￿ + ￿!W) = ￿R + q￿!W; (8)
This condition is the analogous to condition (1) in the example in Section 2. The left-hand
side of equation (8) represents the expected payo⁄ of a manager who invests in the risky
bond. With probability 1 ￿ q, there is no default and the manager gets a return ￿=p￿. If
he survives and there is no exogenous signal, he is not ￿red and gets expected continuation
utility W. If instead there is default, the manager gets zero revenues, is ￿red, and gets 0
continuation utility, due to free entry. Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (8) represents
the expected payo⁄ of a manager who invests in the risk-free bond. He gets always a return
￿R, but only if he survives, there is default, and there is no exogenous signal, he is not ￿red
and gets expected continuation utility W. Otherwise, the investor learns that he was not
informed and ￿res him. The system of equations (5)-(8) determine the equilibrium values of
￿I, p￿, W, and ￿ for a given q, so de￿ning a map P (￿) from q to p￿.


















Assumption A1 guarantees that there are always some uninformed managers investing in
both the risky bond and the riskless asset. Assumption A2 ensures that the proportion of
informed managers among those who are searching for a job is su¢ ciently small that if an
uninformed manager does not make a mistake, he is not ￿red.8 This last assumption is not
crucial, but it makes the analysis simpler.
Proposition 1 Suppose A1 and A2 hold. Then an interior equilibrium exists.
8See the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
133.4 Limit Equilibrium
Let us now focus on the model with MI ! 0. This limit case is very tractable and insightful
at the same time. We show that as MI ! 0, the sequence of interior equilibria converges
to a limit interior equilibrium where the bond price never reveals any information, and is
constant over time. Intuitively, this can be the case because as the fraction of informed
manager is in￿nitesimal, the uninformed managers will have to demand essentially all the
bonds supplied and hence won￿ t learn any information from the equilibrium price.
De￿nition 3 When MI ! 0, a limit interior equilibrium is an equilibrium where the price
p￿ 2 (￿ y=b;1=R) is determined by the indi⁄erence condition of the uninformed managers; the




= dI(￿t+1); the uninformed managers￿demand schedule is dU = f0;1g and their
bond allocation is xU(yt) = (p￿b ￿ yt)=￿; the investors￿strategy is to ￿re manager j if he
receives a negative exogenous signal or if ￿
j
t 6= 1 ￿ ￿(at+1), and keep him otherwise.
In a limit interior equilibrium, career concerns always a⁄ect the bond price by gener-
ating a reputational premium. The equilibrium behaves in a similar way to the general
one, in the case in which the price does not reveal any information. Investors ￿re the man-
agers who reveal to be uninformed, while informed managers never make a mistake and
are never ￿red. The market clearing condition for the risky bond determines the fraction
xU (yt) of uninformed managers who invest in the risky bond. Assumption A1 guarantees
that xU (yt) 2 (0;1) for any yt, so that there are always some uninformed managers invest-
ing in the risky bond and some investing in the risk-free asset. Hence, it must be that the
uninformed managers are indi⁄erent between the two investment possibilities. For a given
default probability q, the equilibrium price p￿ is determined by the same indi⁄erence con-
dition (8), where the expected continuation utility of an employed uninformed manager W













1 ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ q)
￿
:
Similarly to section 2, let ￿ be the di⁄erence between the expected repayment and the





14We call ￿ the reputational premium because it characterizes the price distortion generated
by the career concerns of the uninformed managers.
As a point of comparison, consider a model with MI = 0. In this case, all managers are
uninformed, so investors will be indi⁄erent between keeping the manager they started with
and hiring a new one. Then, there exists an equilibrium where managers are never ￿red and





We call this equilibrium the benchmark equilibrium.
In the benchmark equilibrium, the standard arbitrage condition (11) immediately implies
that ￿ is equal to zero. When instead there is a positive measure of informed managers,
MI > 0, the reputational premium can be negative or positive. Typically, it is positive when
q is su¢ ciently large and negative when q is su¢ ciently small. Betting on large probability
events is especially attractive for an uninformed manager with career concerns, because it
increases the chance that he will not make an unsuccessful decision and will not be ￿red.
The equilibrium price re￿ ects this preference for large probability events. Fund managers
are willing to get a lower expected return in exchange for a large probability of not being
￿red. It is interesting to point out that there is a discontinuity at MI = 0, given that the
benchmark equilibrium disappears as MI > 0, even if MI ! 0.
In the benchmark equilibrium the pricing rule is given by the standard no-arbitrage
condition (11), that is, pB = P B (q) = (1 ￿ q)=R. Notice that the reputational premium is
zero i⁄ q = 1=2 and both P L (q) and P B (q) are decreasing in q. This implies that ￿ > 0 i⁄
q > 1=2 and ￿ < 0 otherwise.
Proposition 1 guarantees that under assumptions A1 and A2, a limit interior equilibrium
exists. The equilibrium regime is determined jointly by the fundamentals of the risky project
and the state of the ￿nancial market. Figure 2 represents graphically both the limit equi-
librium for an economy with career concerns (L) and the benchmark equilibrium (B) when
MI = 0.
In this numerical example we set the parameters so that q < 1=2, and hence P L (q) >
P B (q) and the reputational premium is positive.9 It is immediate to see that if q > 1=2
then P L (q) < P B (q) and the reputational premium is negative. The ￿gure shows that in a
limit interior equilibrium, when q is not too close to 1, prices react more to changes in the
fundamentals of the economy, both on the supply and on the demand side. This is simply
due to the fact that the pricing rule P L (q) is steeper than the benchmark pricing rule P B (q)
9For the numerical example illustrated in Figure 2 we set u(c) = logc and v (c) = c.
















Figure 2: The solid curve and the dotted curve represent the pricing rule in the economy with
career concerns and in the benchmark economy, respectively, while the dashed line shows
the exogenous probability of default. Points L and B denote respectively the limit interior
equilibrium when MI ! 0 and the benchmark equilibrium when MI = 0.
around the equilibrium. For example if there is an exogenous shock either to the default
probability q or to the return of the safe asset R, it is easy to see that prices react more
in a limit equilibrium than in the benchmark equilibrium. This shows the essence of the
ampli￿cation result that we will discuss in more detail in Section 4.4, after introducing the
extended model with endogenous supply.
4 Endogenous Bond Supply
In this section, we extend the model in order to endogenize the supply of risky bonds and
their default probability. In particular, we introduce entrepreneurs who issue the risky bond
described so far in order to ￿nance a risky project they have access to. We assume that
they can decide to default ex post on their loans at a given cost. In our baseline model we
have established that the equilibrium bond price is a⁄ected by the default probability. This
extended model generates a feedback e⁄ect from the bond price to the borrowing and default
choice. We will see that this feedback e⁄ect magni￿es the ampli￿cation generated by the
presence of career concerns.
4.1 Entrepreneurs
The set up of the economy is identical to the one presented in Section 3.1 except that now b
and q are endogenous objects. There are overlapping generations of entrepreneurs who live
for two periods. A generation is represented by a continuum of measure 1 of entrepreneurs.
16In each period a new generation is born. Consider an entrepreneur born at time t. When
she is young, she can choose to pay a cost k > 0 to invest in a risky project with return at+1,
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(at+1) with at+1 2 [0;1), or
to enjoy an outside option that gives her utility V . Assume that k ￿ ￿ y to ensure that the
supply of the risky bond is always big enough to cover the demand of the noise traders. If the
entrepreneur decides to undertake the risky project, she can borrow by issuing one-period
discount bonds. De￿ne pt the price of the bonds issued at time t. The entrepreneur chooses
how much to borrow and how much to consume, taking pt as given. When she is young, her
budget constraint is
ct + k ￿ ptbt+1; (12)
where ct represents consumption at time t and bt+1 represents the one-period discount bonds
issued at time t. There is an upper bound ￿ b on how much entrepreneurs can borrow.
When she is old, she collects the project pay-o⁄ at and has the option to default on her
debt bt+1. If she defaults she does not repay the debt, but she su⁄ers an output loss of
(1 ￿ ￿)at, that is, she keeps only ￿at of the return on the project. If she does not default,
she has to repay her debt and consume the rest. Her budget constraint when old is




bt+1 ￿ ￿t+1 (1 ￿ ￿)at+1; (13)
where ￿t+1 = ￿(pt;at+1) : [p;1=R]￿R+ 7! f0;1g denotes the default decision that the agent
is making at time t + 1 taking as given the price pt and after observing the realization of
at+1. Hence, the default probability q which was exogenous in the previous section is now
endogenous with qt ￿ Et[￿t+1].
The problem for an active entrepreneur born at t is to maximize her utility
u(ct) + ￿E[v (ct+1)jpt];
subject to (12) and (13), taking pt as given. We assume that u(￿) and v (￿) are increasing
and concave and have continuous ￿rst and second derivative. Moreover,
￿cu
00 (c)=u
0 (c) ￿ 1: (A3)
The problem can be rewritten as
V (pt) = max
bt+1￿￿ b;￿t+1










17Ex ante, an entrepreneur will choose to undertake the risky project if and only if V (pt) ￿ V .
We denote the aggregate supply of bonds issued by entrepreneurs at a given price by B (pt),
which corresponds to b in the previous section.
In order to have a well-behaved problem we also need to make the following assumption.
Assumption A4. For any p 2 (p;1=R), assume that the function








v (a ￿ b)dF(a)




and there exists an optimum V (p) = maxb2[0;￿ b] ￿(p;b).
Assumption A5 is satis￿ed for many di⁄erent parametric assumptions. For example, it is
satis￿ed if we assume u(c) = log(c), v (c) = c and 1 ￿ F (a) = a￿a￿￿, with a > 1=￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
and ￿ < 1, as in Figure 3. Intuitively, it rules out the possibility that the marginal cost of
default is not large enough compared to the advantage of additional borrowing. In that case,
the entrepreneur would always like to borrow more and default more often, so that problem
(14) could not have a ￿nite solution.
4.2 Interior Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the natural extension of a stationary interior equilibrium for
our baseline model as de￿ned in De￿nition 2. In the extended model, informed managers
have superior information about the project productivity at+1, from which they can infer the
entrepreneurs￿default decision ￿(pt;at+1). Again, there are going to be three regimes, two
with full revelation with default and no default respectively, and one where no information
is revealed. The last regime is the more interesting one, where uninformed managers are the
marginal traders, that is, are indi⁄erent between investing in the bond and in the risk-free
asset. A su¢ cient assumption to ensure that prices are not always fully revealing is now
￿ y ￿ 2MI. In the extended model, the equilibrium prices, the managers￿demand schedules,
the bond allocation, and the investors￿￿ring rule are the same as in conditions (i)-(iv)
in De￿nition 2, with the caveat that borrowing and default are now endogenous, that is,
b = B (pt) and ￿t+1 = ￿(pt;at+1), and that p substitutes yt=b for any yt, where p is such
that V (p) = V . Moreover, now the entrepreneurs￿borrowing and default decisions are also





b with pr. yt=(pb) and 0 otherwise if pt = p
b￿ if pt = p￿
~ b if pt = 1=R
; (15)
18where b￿ > ~ b, both in [0;b], and the equilibrium default rule is ￿(pt;at+1) = 1 if and only if
at+1 < ^ a(pt;yt), where ^ a(pt;yt) = b(pt;yt)=(1 ￿ ￿).
An interior equilibrium for the extended model is characterized by equilibrium values for
￿I, p, p￿, b￿, ~ b, which ensure that the adapted versions of conditions (i)-(iv) in De￿nition
2, condition 15, and the default rule ^ a(pt;yt) = b(pt;yt)=(1 ￿ ￿) characterize a stationary
equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs do not have superior information about at+1 and also learn information
from the equilibrium price only when it is fully revealing. If pt = p, entrepreneurs know that
all managers think that there is going to be default and that they are going to invest in the
risk-free asset. Hence, they do not have any incentive not to default and if they are able
to issue some bonds, they choose to borrow as much as they can, b, and always to default.
However, in this case, the demand for bonds comes only from noise traders and is equal to
yt. Hence, in order to have an equilibrium it must be that the entrepreneurs are indi⁄erent
between borrowing b and defaulting with probability 1 and get their outside option V , that
is, p must be exactly such that V (p) = V . At that price a fraction yt=(pb) of entrepreneurs
becomes active and borrows from noise traders, while the others stay out of the market and
get their outside option. If pt = p￿, entrepreneurs do not have any additional information on
at+1 and choose b￿ to maximize their expected utility. Finally, if pt = 1=R, they know that
all the managers believe that there is not going to be default and choose to borrow ~ b and
default whenever at+1 < ~ b=(1 ￿ ￿), which is never the case. Hence, in equilibrium it must
be that ~ b < b￿.
For a given q and p, the equilibrium value of ￿I is jointly determined with W and ￿
by equations (5)-(7), where (7) is modi￿ed to take into account that the probability of full
revelation is now endogenous.10 Then, equation (8) de￿nes a pricing map P (￿) that gives
a price for any given default probability q. Also, we can de￿ne a repayment map Q(￿)
which assigns a default probability to any given price p. This map is given by Q(p) ￿
F(B (p)=(1 ￿ ￿)) where B (p) is implicitly de￿ned by the optimality condition of problem
(14) in the case of no information revelation, that is,
pu





0 (at+1 ￿ B (p))dF(at+1) = 0: (16)
Hence, an interior equilibrium, in the regime of no revelation, is characterized by a price p￿
and a default probability q￿ that solve p￿ = P (q￿) and q￿ = Q(p￿).
In order to ensure that an interior equilibrium exists, we still need assumption A2 together
10See equation (23) in the Appendix.
19with a modi￿ed version of A1, that is,
M










which ensures that there are always some uninformed managers investing in both the risky
bond and the riskless asset. In the next proposition, we state su¢ cient conditions for the
existence of a stationary equilibrium. Let us de￿ne










Proposition 2 For a given MI > 0, such that assumptions A1￿ , A2, A3, and A4 hold and
P (~ q) < 1=R and P (￿ q) > p; (17)
an interior equilibrium exists.
4.3 Limit Equilibrium
As in the baseline case, we focus on a limit interior stationary equilibrium with MI ! 0,
which is the natural extension of the equilibrium described in De￿nition 3.
De￿nition 4 A limit interior equilibrium with MI ! 0, is an equilibrium where p￿ 2
(￿ y=b;1=R) is determined by the indi⁄erence condition of the uninformed managers; the




= dI(￿t+1); the uninformed managers￿demand correspondence is dU = f0;1g and
their bond allocation is xU (yt) = (p￿b ￿ yt)=￿; the investors￿strategy is to ￿re manager j if
he receives a negative exogenous signal or ￿
j
t 6= 1￿￿(at+1), and keep him otherwise; the bor-
rowers￿strategy is b￿ 2 [0;b] and ￿(pt;at+1) = 0if at+1 ￿ ^ a￿ and ￿(pt;at+1) = 1 otherwise,
with ^ a￿ = b￿=(1 ￿ ￿).
As in the baseline model, the limit equilibrium behaves in a similar way to an interior
equilibrium with MI > 0, in the case in which the price does not reveal any information.
In particular, it can be characterized by the constant bond price and default probability, p￿
and q￿, which solve the ￿xed point problem de￿ned by p￿ = P L (q￿) and q￿ = Q(p￿). On
the one hand, the pricing rule P L (￿) is exactly the same as in the baseline model, that is,
P
L (q) ￿
(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿!q)
[1 ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ q)]R
:
20On the other hand the repayment rule is the same as described in the general model, that
is, Q(p) ￿ F(B (p)=(1 ￿ ￿)) with B (p) solving condition (16).
Next lemma establishes some important properties of entrepreneurs￿optimal behavior.11
Lemma 1 In a limit equilibrium, as p increases, (i) the face value of debt B (p) decreases,
(ii) the probability of default Q(p) decreases, and (iii) the value of the bonds pB (p) increases.
As borrowing becomes cheaper, entrepreneurs need to borrow less and, hence, there is
higher chance that they can repay their debt. This implies that the probability of default
decreases as a function of the bond price, that is, q is downward sloping in the space (p;q)
as shown in Figure 3 below. Moreover, thanks to assumption A3, the value of the borrowing
pb increases, because entrepreneurs want to smooth consumption between the two periods
of their life and, hence, they decrease b less than proportionally with respect to the initial
increase of p.
Once again, as a point of comparison, consider the benchmark equilibrium, where en-
trepreneurs behave exactly as described above, but all managers are uninformed, MI = 0,
investors never ￿re any manager, and managers maximize their period by period pro￿t. Such
an equilibrium can also be characterized by a ￿xed point
￿
^ aB;pB￿










Proposition 2 guarantees that, under assumptions A1￿and A2-A4, a limit equilibrium
exists. The equilibrium regime is determined jointly by the fundamentals of the risky project
and the state of the ￿nancial market. Figure 3 represents graphically both the limit equi-
librium for an economy with career concerns (L) and the benchmark equilibrium (B). The
prices in the two equilibria, respectively, p￿ and pB, correspond to the intersections of the
repayment rule Q(p) and the corresponding pricing rule, that is, P L (q) and P B (q), graphed
in the space (p;q).
Notice that the premium is zero i⁄ q￿ = qB = 1=2 and p￿ = pB = 1=2R. Moreover, both
P L (q) and P B (q) are decreasing in q. This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, one of the following reputational regimes arises: (i) if q￿ =
1=2, then ￿￿ = 0, (ii) if q￿ < 1=2, then ￿￿ < 0; (iii) if q￿ > 1=2, then ￿￿ > 0.
In the baseline numerical exercise we assume that u(c) = logc, v (c) = c and F (a) =
1￿a￿a￿￿. In Figure 3, we choose a = 1:5, ￿ = :6, and k = :45. Such parameters implies that
11Note that the same Lemma applies to the general equilibrium when the economy is in a not revealing
regime.
















Figure 3: The solid curve and the dotted curve represent the pricing rule in the economy with
career concerns and in the benchmark economy, respectively, while the dashed line shows
the probability of default, that is now endogenous. Points L and B denote respectively the
limit interior equilibrium when MI ! 0 and the benchmark equilibrium when MI = 0.
q￿ < 1=2 and then p￿ > pB, that is, that the premium is positive. Changing the parameters,
we can easily obtain the analogous ￿gure where p￿ < pB and the premium is negative. For
example, this is the case if we decrease the lower bound for the productivity process a to 1.
4.4 Ampli￿cation
Next, we analyze some interesting properties of the limit equilibrium. In particular, we
are interested in the reaction of the economy to shocks both to ￿nancial markets and to the
fundamentals of the risky project. The ￿rst type of shocks a⁄ect the pricing rule and we refer
to them as demand-side shocks; the second type a⁄ect the repayment rule and we label them
supply-side shocks. Our main result is that there is an ampli￿cation e⁄ect that magni￿es
the reaction of the equilibrium to both types of shocks, in comparison to the benchmark
equilibrium. The mechanism behind this result is that both types of shocks can move the
economy from one reputational regime to the other, generating a natural ampli￿cation in
the price and in the default probability.
Let us focus on the vector of parameters ￿ = (R;￿), where R is the return on the risk-free
asset and ￿ represents a parameter a⁄ecting the distribution of the productivity shock a,
such that if ￿00 > ￿0, then F (aj￿00) < F (aj￿0). Assume that lim￿!￿1 F (aj￿) = 1. A change
in R represents a typical demand-side shock, that is, a change in the return of alternative
investment opportunities. A change in ￿, instead, represents a ￿rst-order stochastic shift of
the productivity distribution of the risky project, that is, a typical supply-side shock.
With a slight abuse of notation, let us denote by (q￿ (￿);p￿ (￿)) and (qB (￿);pB (￿)) the
22equilibrium default probability and price, respectively in the limit equilibrium and in the
benchmark equilibrium, when the parameters are ￿. When there are multiple equilibria, let
us focus on the equilibrium with the highest bond price.
Next proposition states our main ampli￿cation result.
Proposition 4 Suppose there exists a pair (￿0;￿00) such that qB(￿0) < 1=2, qB(￿00) > 1=2,
and q￿(￿00) > 1=2. Then, there is ampli￿cation, that is, q￿(￿00) ￿ q￿(￿0) > qB(￿00) ￿ qB(￿0)
and p￿(￿00) ￿ p￿(￿0) > pB(￿00) ￿ pB(￿0).
Proposition 4 shows that if there is a change in the parameters such that the equilibrium
switches regime from a positive premium to a negative premium, then both prices and default
probabilities respond more than in the benchmark model. Suppose, for example, we start
from a regime where the premium is negative. As the outside investment opportunities
improve, that is, R increases, the bond price decreases making borrowing more expensive
and default happening more often. If the shock is big enough, it can generates a shift in the
sign of the premium and a switch of regime. Alternatively, the economy can move from a
regime to another because of a change in the parameters on the supply-side of the model.
For example, a big enough decrease in ￿ can increase the default probability enough to make
the premium negative. The e⁄ect on both prices and quantities is ampli￿ed in comparison
to the benchmark model.
Next proposition shows that when, for a given set of parameters, there exists a unique
interior equilibrium with a negative reputational premium, it is possible to change R or ￿
enough to generate a shift in the reputational regime.
Proposition 5 Suppose there exists a unique interior equilibrium for any ￿ = (R;￿), with
R ￿ 0 and ￿ 2 [￿;￿] for some ￿ and ￿. Take a ￿0 = (R0;￿0) with q￿ (￿0) < 1=2. Then,
1. there exists ^ R > R0 such that for any R00 > ^ R, q￿ (￿00) > 1=2, where ￿00 = (R00;￿0);
2. if ￿ is su¢ ciently low, there exists ^ ￿ with ￿ < ^ ￿ < ￿0 such that for any ￿00 with
￿ < ￿00 < ^ ￿, q￿ (￿00) > 1=2, where ￿00 = (R0;￿00).
Propositions 4 and 5 show that as the ￿nancial environment or the fundamentals of the
risky project change, the economy can switch from a regime with low bond spreads (high
p) and high level of capital invested in the risky bond market (high pb) to a regime with
high bond spreads (low p) and low level of capital invested (low pb). The ￿rst type of
regimes are frequently described as regimes of abundant liquidity or with traders reaching
for yield. To describe phenomena where the economy switch to the second type of regime,
23common terms are ￿ight-to-quality, ￿ight-to-liquidity, disappeared liquidity, or drop in risk
appetite. In our model, phenomena of this type can arise even if fund managers are risk-
neutral and their aggregate funds are constant. We argue that abrupt changes in prices
can be caused by managers￿career concerns. In good times, when the default probability
of credit instruments is low, it is very attractive for uninformed fund managers to invest in
these instruments because if they prefer less risky investment opportunities, they are likely
to produce lower returns, lose reputation, and, hence, funds. If suddenly a negative shock
hits either the demand or the supply side of the market, the probability of default increases,
and investing in the risky asset increases the probability of losing their reputation. Hence,
prices increase not only because of the higher probability of default, but also because of an
additional premium coming from career concerns. This generates the ampli￿cation result we
have discussed.
It is well known in ￿nance that the premium on risky assets is time-varying: the di⁄erence
between the expected return on risky asset and riskless assets is lower in good times than
in bad times. The most established explanations connect this fact to time-varying marginal
utility of consumption due to habit formation, to time-varying probability of disasters or to a
slow-moving component in consumption risk.12 In our model the premium changes, because
the time-varying risk that a given investment results in large fund out￿ ows. In contrast to
the established explanations, our mechanism implies that in good times some managers are
willing to take risky bets without the su¢ cient compensation in returns. This argument is
consistent with several empirical observations across various markets. For example, regarding
emerging market bonds, Du¢ e et al. (2003) document that the implied short spread of
Russian bonds was spectacularly low during the ￿rst 10 months of 1997. Moreover, their
estimation shows that in one short interval in 1997, bond prices were so high that the implied
risk-neutral default adjusted short spread was negative. Although this implication relies
heavily on their speci￿c term structure model, it worth to point out that this is inconsistent
with most established explanations of time-varying premium, but consistent with our model.
Similarly, Coval, Jurek and Sta⁄ord (2008) argue that in the period 2004- September
2007 collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) provided too little compensation for risk com-
pared to portfolios of securities of the same pay-o⁄ structure. As CDOs are traded only by
institutional investors, our mechanism is a good candidate to explain this phenomenon.
Finally, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) argues that hedge funds were investing heavily
in technological stocks during the dotcom bubble. Furthermore, they also argue that fund
managers seemed to be aware of the mispricing. Our model suggests that part of the reason
of the willingness of hedge funds to buy technological stocks at highly in￿ ated prices was
12See Cochrane (2006) for a detailed review.
24their fear of loss of funds if they miss out on the opportunity. This is consistent with the
additional ￿nding of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) that the largest hedge fund (Tiger
Fund) which refused to invest in technology stocks experienced severe fund out￿ ows in 1999
compared to its main competitor who did invest in technology stocks (Quantum Fund).
5 Persistent Productivity Shock
In this section, we generalize the model to allow for persistency in the productivity process
of the risky project. In particular, assume that at+1 is distributed according to a ￿rst-order
Markov process with cumulative density function G(at+1jat). The environment is a natural
generalization of the one with i:i:d: shock, where at represents an additional state variable.
We look for a Markovian equilibrium, which extends the notion of interior equilibrium de-
scribed in de￿nition 3.
De￿nition 5 A Markovian interior equilibrium with MI ! 0 is an equilibrium where
p￿ (at) 2 (0;1=R) is determined by the indi⁄erence condition of the uninformed managers;
the informed managers￿ bond allocation is xI(yt;at+1) = 1 ￿ ￿(yt;at+1); the uninformed
managers￿allocation is xU (yt;at) = (p￿ (at)b￿ (at) ￿ yt)=￿; the investors￿strategy is to ￿re
manager j if he receives a negative exogenous signal or ￿
j
t 6= 1 ￿ ￿(yt;at+1), and keep him
otherwise; the borrowers￿strategy is b￿ (at) > 0 and ￿(yt;at+1) = 0if either at+1 ￿ ^ a￿ (at),
and ￿(yt;at+1) = 1, otherwise.
When the process for at is not i:i:d:, the expected utility of the uninformed managers at
time t depends on the realization of at, because they can use the past information to update
the distribution of at+1, that is,




Moreover, their indi⁄erence condition becomes










This condition implicitly de￿nes the equilibriumprice as a function of the state at, P (at;q (at)) =
p(at), and the default rule ^ a(at) where ^ a(at) = F ￿1 (q (at)).
Also borrowers update their expectation of the distribution of at+1, conditional on at.
Their default rule is Q(at;p(at)) = F(B (at;p(at))=(1 ￿ ￿)jat), where B (at;p(at)) = b(at)
25is implicitly de￿ned by
p(at)u





0 (at+1 ￿ b(at))dF(at+1jat) = 0:
Hence, a Markovian interior equilibrium is characterized by a ￿xed point such that p￿ (at) =
P (at;q￿ (at)) and q￿ (at) = Q(at;p￿ (at)).
Here have performed some numerical exercises to illustrate the dynamic properties of
our equilibrium when productivity shocks are persistent. In particular, we show how career
concerns can magnify the reaction of the economy to shocks, hence, increasing the volatility
of prices.
Let us ￿rst consider the equilibrium behavior in the benchmark economy. As a bad shock
hits, the ￿nancial market realizes that, even for a given default rule, the probability of default
is higher and requires a lower bond price. As borrowing becomes more expensive, borrowers
increase their default cut-o⁄, magnifying the reduction in the bond price. A lower bond
price also decreases the amount of capital entrepreneurs borrow, so capital ￿ ows out from
the market of risky bonds. Hence, for low realizations of productivity, the default cut-o⁄will
be higher and the bond price and the dollar value of outstanding bonds lower. Now, consider
the economy with career concerns and suppose the default probability is high enough that the
premium is positive. In this case, the ￿nancial market will require a bond price even lower
than the benchmark economy because of the negative reputational premium. Given that
productivity is persistent, a bad realization of the shock will further increase the probability
of default, increasing the fear of the uninformed managers of being ￿red and pushing the
bond price further down. This implies that the premium itself is higher after bad shocks and
can even switch sign.
We report the numerical results for an example similar to the one illustrated in Figure
3 with u(c) = logc and v (c) = c. However, now log(at) follows an AR(1) process.13
Figure 4 shows how the premium varies in equilibrium with the di⁄erent realizations of the
productivity shocks.
Now, consider an economy that at time zero is hit by a shock. Figure 5 shows how the
equilibrium prices react in expected terms to a bad and to a good shock, both with and
without career concerns. The ￿gure shows our ampli￿cation result: the economy with career
concerns reacts more to the shocks than the benchmark economy. Moreover, notice that in
the economy considered, the premium would be negative in expected terms and a bad shock
can actually make the economy shift regime.
13Figures (4) and (5) use the following process for at: log(at+1) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿log(at) + "t with ￿ = :7,
￿ = 2:8 and "t ￿ N (0;2). Moreover, ￿ = :75, ￿ = :5, ￿ = 1, k = :4, and ￿ = :1.














Figure 4: The ￿gure shows the reputational premium as a function of the realization of
log(a). The solid line is the premium with career concerns and the dotted line shows the
premium in the benchmark case.













Figure 5: The two panels show the reaction of the equilibrium prices to a bad and a good
shock, respectively. The dotted line represents the price in the benchmark economy, and the
solid line the price in the economy with career concerns. At time zero productivity drops to
the lowest possible realization in the ￿rst case and rises to the highest possible one in the
second case.
276 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a general equilibrium model of delegated portfolio man-
agement where career concerns distort asset prices. In particular, risky bonds trade with
a reputational premium, which may be positive or negative depending on the equilibrium
default probability. When the probability of default is su¢ ciently high, fund managers prefer
to invest in safe bonds even at a lower expected return to reduce the probability of being
￿red. As the economic and ￿nancial conditions change, the reputational premium can switch
sign, amplifying the reaction of prices and capital ￿ ows.
For future research, it would be interesting to introduce alternative risky assets in the
portfolio choice of the managers. In this case, our mechanism would generate contagion.
Imagine that there are two risky bonds and a riskless asset. The cost of investing in the
risk-less asset depends on the default probability of both the risky bonds. If none of them
defaults, the manager who invests in the risk-less asset looses his reputation. Thus, if the
probability of default of any of the risky bonds decreases, the risk-less asset will be less
attractive, and the prices of both bonds will have to increase in order to make uninformed
managers indi⁄erent between di⁄erent investment opportunities.
Finally, an interesting application of our model is to sovereign debt. A large literature on
business cycle characteristics of emerging markets 14 highlights that emerging market bond
spreads are very volatile. In particular, the magnitude of volatility of interest rates is hard
to reconcile with models where bond prices are determined by the standard no-arbitrage
condition. Our model provides an appealing framework to think about this excess volatility.
It would be interesting to calibrate our model to quantify how much of the volatility of
speci￿c emerging markets bonds can be explained with our mechanism.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Here we show that there exists a unique interior stationary equilibrium, as characterized
in de￿nition 2, where ￿I, p￿, W, and ￿ solve the system of equations (5)-(8). The proof
proceeds in four steps. We ￿rst show that the managers￿￿ ows are consistent with the labor
market for fund managers and that there exist unique values for ￿I, W, and ￿ that solve (5)-
(7); second we show that the demand schedules chosen by the managers, (ii) in de￿nition 2,
are optimal; third we prove that the bond￿ s allocation, (iii), ensures that the bond￿ s market
14See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), Arellano (2006), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
Longsta⁄ et al (2007)
28clears and that there exists a unique p￿ that satis￿es (8); and ￿nally we show that the ￿ring
decision of the investors, (iv), is optimal.
Step 1. First we show that, given conditions (i)-(iv) in de￿nition 2, there exist three
constant values ￿, ￿I, and ￿U consistent with free entry in the job market for fund managers.
Thanks to free entry and the assumption that there is a large continuum of uninformed
managers, condition (6) holds and an uninformed managers looking for a job gets zero ex
ante utility. On the contrary, there is a constant mass MI of informed managers, who are
never ￿red in equilibrium, and get positive expected utility when searching for a job. It
follows that they all search for a job at any t, and hence NI
t = MI ￿ ￿￿I
t, where ￿I satis￿es
condition (5). Conditions (5) and (6) together with condition (7) determine unique values for

























Notice that lim￿!0 g (￿) = 1, lim￿!1 g (￿) < 0 thanks to the assumption that ￿ < ￿R,
and g0 (￿) < 0 by inspection. It immediately follows that there exists a unique ￿ 2 (0;1)
such that g (￿) = 0. Given ￿, one can use equation (5) to solve for a unique ￿I < MI, and
equation (7) to solve for a unique W. Finally, ￿U must be such that the mass of employed
uninformed managers stay constant after 1 ￿ ￿ of them die, 1 ￿ !￿t of them are ￿red and ￿
of the unemployed uninformed are hired, that is,
￿
U = ￿￿























Hence, conditions (18) and (19) together with ￿U = ￿ ￿ ￿I determine the value of NU
t for
any t, changing over time together with ￿t, that guarantees that ￿U is uniquely determined
and the equilibrium is stationary.
Step 2. Next, we show that the managers￿demand schedules characterized in condition
(ii) of de￿nition 2 are optimal, taking as given conditions (i), (ii) and (iv). First, notice that
at any t there are three possible regimes. Recall that yt is uniformly distributed on [0;y],
and hence zt must be in
￿
0; ￿ y + ￿I￿
. From the equilibrium pricing condition (i), if pt ￿ y=b,
29then zt 2 [0;￿I) and the uninformed managers learn that ￿t+1 = 1. If, instead, pt = 1=R,
then zt 2 (￿ y; ￿ y + ￿I] and they learn that ￿t+1 = 0. In both these cases, the price is fully




and the uninformed managers update
their beliefs about the probability of default as follows:
Pr
￿













￿t+1 = 0;zt 2 [￿I; ￿ y]
￿:










￿t+1 = 0 and yt 2
￿
0; ￿ y ￿ ￿I￿
. Given that yt is uniformly distributed, the ￿rst case arises
with probability q
￿
￿ y ￿ ￿I￿
=￿ y and the second with probability (1 ￿ q)
￿
￿ y ￿ ￿I￿
=￿ y. It follows
that Pr
￿
￿t+1 = 1jp = p￿￿
= q. This shows that, thanks to the uniform distribution of yt, the
price p￿ does not reveal any information.
When pt = 1=R and there is full revelation of no default, the risky bond pays for sure
1=R and is equivalent to the risk-free asset. Hence, both the informed and the uninformed
managers are indi⁄erent between the two bonds and dI(pt;￿t+1) = dU(pt) = f0;1g if pt =
1=R. When instead pt < 1=R, informed managers will always choose to invest in the risk-free
asset if there is going to be default, and in the bond if there is not going to be default, that
is, dI(pt;￿t+1) = 1 ￿ ￿t+1. This is optimal for them given that investors ￿re managers who
do not do that. Also, they do not have any incentive to deviate, given that the bond price
is smaller than 1=R. However, the uninformed managers cannot follow the same strategy
because they do not know ￿t+1. When pt ￿ y=b, there is full revelation and they learn that
there is going to be default. Hence, it is optimal to demand dU (pt) = 0 to avoid to be ￿red.
If, instead, pt = p￿, there is no information revelation and they are indi⁄erent between the
two assets, that is, dU (pt) = f0;1g. By combining equations (7) and (8) we immediately
obtain the not revealing price as a function of the default probability q, that is, we obtain
the following pricing rule:
p





￿I=￿ y + q
￿
1 ￿ ￿I=￿ y
￿￿￿
R[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 + ￿I=￿ y)]
; (20)
where ￿I is jointly determined by equations (5), (6), and (7). Given that in step 1 we have




that solve (5), (6), and (7), it is immediate
to see that for any q, there exists a unique p￿ that satis￿es equation (20).
Step 3. Given the equilibrium prices (i) and the equilibrium conditions (ii) and (iii)
in De￿nition 2, it is easy to show that the bond allocation de￿ned in (iii) is consistent
30with the managers￿demand and ensures that the bond market clears. If zt 2 [0;￿I), all
managers demand the riskless asset and the auctioneer must allocate risky bonds only to
the noise traders yt. Given that in this case the price is equal to yt=b, the market clearing
condition is automatically satis￿ed. If zt 2 (￿ y; ￿ y + ￿I], all managers are indi⁄erent between
the two assets, the price is 1=R and the auctioneer can randomly allocate the risky bond
to the managers. In particular, the allocation xI(￿t+1;yt) = xU(￿t+1;yt) = (b=R ￿ yt)=￿
guarantees that the bond market clears. If instead zt 2 [￿I; ￿ y], there is no information
revelation. Given that the auctioneer￿ s allocation must be consistent with the managers￿
demand schedule, the informed managers obtain the risky bond if and only if they demand
it, that is, xI ￿
￿t+1;yt
￿
= 1 ￿ ￿t+1, while the uninformed managers are indi⁄erent between
the two assets, and the allocation xU(￿t+1;yt) = (bp￿ ￿ zt)=￿U guarantees that the market
clearing condition is satis￿ed. Moreover, assumption A1 guarantees that p￿ 2 (￿ y=b;1=R)
and ensures that (bp￿ ￿ zt)=￿U 2 (0;1), so that the allocation is internally consistent.
Step 4. Finally, we show that the investors￿￿ring rule (iv) in de￿nition (2) is optimal,
given conditions (i)-(iii). First, notice that investors are indi⁄erent between an informed
and an uninformed manager when pt = 1=R or pt ￿ ￿ y=b; and all managers choose the same
demand schedule. However, when pt = p￿, the expected return of an informed manager is
higher. Hence, investors would like to have informed managers investing their capital, and
in order to make their ￿ring decisions, they assess the probability that employed managers
are informed. At the end of time t, each investor observes the investment realization of
his manager ￿
j
t and the default realization ￿t+1. Then if pt < 1=R and either ￿t+1 = 0 and
￿
j
t = 1, or ￿t+1 = 1 and ￿
j
t = 0, he realizes that his manager is not informed, that is, ￿
j
t+1 = 0.
In this case, the investor ￿res him, since there is always a positive probability that a new
hire is informed, denoted by "t+1, and the probability of ￿nding a new manager is always
equal to 1. By de￿nition "t+1 satis￿es
"t+1 =
MI ￿ ￿￿I
MI ￿ ￿￿I + NU
t
> 0: (21)
For the same reason, the investor also ￿res an uninformed manager whose type is revealed
by an exogenous signal with probability 1 ￿ !. On the other hand, if the manager does
not make a mistake, that is, if ￿
j
t = 1 ￿ ￿t+1 and/or pt = 1=R, so that he does not reveal
to be uninformed, then he is not ￿red if and only if his updated belief ￿
j
t+1 is higher than
"t+1.When manager j realizes ￿
j







t + !￿t(1 ￿ ￿
j
t)], where ￿t, de￿ned in (19), represents the proportion
of uninformed managers who make the same investment decision of the informed managers.
Next, we show that assumption A2 is su¢ cient to make sure that in equilibrium ￿
j
t+1 ￿ "t+1
31for any ￿t and ￿
j
t > 0.
First, consider an investor who has just hired manager j and hence, by de￿nition, has
prior belief ￿
j
t = "t. In this case, if ￿
j
t = 1 ￿ ￿t+1, then ￿
j
t+1 = "t=["t + !￿t (1 ￿ "t)]. Next,
we want to show that ￿
j














hence, condition (22) can be rewritten as NU
t =NU
t￿1 ￿ !￿t, where NU
t = (1 ￿ !￿t￿)￿U=￿.





ensured by assumption A2.
Let us now consider managers who were working for an investor for longer than 1 period.
First, notice that the investors￿beliefs about any manager who is still working but was hired
at time t ￿ ￿ with ￿ 2 [0;t] must be higher than the initial belief "t￿￿, given that if he was
not ￿red he never made any mistake, that is, ￿
j
t ￿ "t￿￿. Hence, the belief about a manager














"t￿￿ + !￿t￿￿(1 ￿ "t￿￿)
:









which, by the same argument, is satis￿ed when assumption A2 holds. For the same reason,
when pt = 1=R no manager is ￿red, given that there is no information in their action,
completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Here we show that there exists a unique interior stationary equilibrium, as characterized in
section 4.2. The proof proceeds in two steps: ￿rst we show that the proof of existence for
the baseline model goes through for the extended model to show that managers investment
decision and investors￿￿ring rule are optimal, and that the bond￿ s allocation ensures that
the bond￿ s market clears, moreover we show that entrepreneurs decision are optimal as well;
second we show that there exists a unique ￿xed point that determines the pair (p￿;q￿).
Step 1. First, the equilibrium prices are identical to the ones in the baseline model,
32except for the price in the regime with full revelation of default, which is now p instead
of y=b, where p is such that V (p) = V . The proof that the managers￿demand schedule
and the investors￿￿ring rule are actually optimal, taking as given all the other equilibrium
objects is analogous to the one for the baseline model above, with the only caveat that
now ￿t+1 = ￿(at+1;yt), b = b(pt;yt) and p substitutes y=b. With the same modi￿cations,
the bond allocation is the same of the baseline model and follows from the bond market
clearing as we have shown above. The new part of the proof is to show that the borrowing
and default decisions of the entrepreneurs are actually optimal, taking as given the other
equilibrium objects. That is, that, in equilibrium, condition (15) is satis￿ed, with ~ b < b￿ in
[0;￿ b], and ￿(pt;at+1) = 1fat+1 < ^ a(pt;yt)g, where ^ a(pt;yt) = b(pt;yt)=(1 ￿ ￿).
Active entrepreneurs choose their default rule and how much to borrow and to consume
in order to solve problem (14), taking pt as given. Let us ￿rst consider the default decision
of an old entrepreneur. For a given realization of the shock at+1, she will default if and only
if at+1￿bt+1 < ￿at+1. Then ￿(pt;at+1) = 1 if at+1 ￿ ^ a(pt;yt) and ￿(pt;at+1) = 0, otherwise,
with ^ a(pt;yt) = b(pt;yt)=(1 ￿ ￿). Given that yt is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1,
the signal of the uninformed zt = ￿I ￿
1 ￿ ￿t+1
￿
+yt must be in
￿
0; ￿ y + ￿I￿
. If pt = 1=R, then
zt 2 (￿ y; ￿ y + ￿I], and the uninformed managers learn that ￿(pt;at+1) = 0. If instead pt = p,
then zt 2 [0;￿I), and they learn that ￿t+1 = 1. If instead pt = p￿, as in the baseline model,
there is no information revealed.
In the ￿rst case, pt = 1=R and there is full revelation that ￿(pt;at+1) = 0. De￿ne ^ ae the
default rule expected by the managers. Given that the entrepreneurs learn that at+1 ￿ ^ ae,





























v (at+1 ￿ b)dF (at+1):






















0 (at+1 ￿ b)dF (at+1):
Hence, in order for this to be an equilibrium it must be that ^ ae = ~ b=(1 ￿ ￿), so that the
default rule is consistent with the managers￿expectations. Moreover, we have to check that
if prices are not revealing, that is, pt = p￿, entrepreneurs would default for any at+1 < ^ ae,
33that is, that b￿ ￿ ~ b, where b￿ solves ~ g (b￿) = 0, with
~ g (b) ￿ p
￿u
0 (p





0 (at+1 ￿ b)dF(at+1):
Hence, it is enough to show that ~ g(~ b) > 0. This comes straight from assumption A3.
In the second case, pt = p and there is full revelation that ￿(pt;at+1) = 1. Let again
denote by ^ ae the default rule expected by the managers. Then, it must be that at+1 < ^ ae
and the entrepreneurs problem (14) can be written as
b(p) = argmax
b















v (at+1 ￿ b)dF (at+1):
In order to have an equilibrium it must be that ^ ae = ￿ b=(1 ￿ ￿) and hence it is immediate
that b(p) = ￿ b. It follows that if prices are not revealing entrepreneurs would not default for
any at+1 ￿ ^ ae given that by construction b￿ < ￿ b. Moreover, p must be such that











This, guarantees that they can choose a mixed strategy to ensure that the bond market
clears. When pt = p the demand for the risky bond is given by yt, so that to have market
clearing it must be that the entrepreneurs choose to borrow with probability yt=(p￿ b), and
take their outside option and borrow 0 with probability 1 ￿ yt=(p￿ b).
Finally, when pt = p￿, then zt 2 [￿I; ￿ y] and no information is revealed. This implies
that the entrepreneurs have no additional information on the realization of at+1. After
substituting the default decision ￿(pt;at+1), for any p 2 (p;1=R) problem (14) becomes
maxb￿￿ b ￿(p;b). Let B (p) denote the optimal borrowing policy for a given non fully revealing
price p 2 (p;1=R) and, thanks to assumption A4, is implicitly de￿ned by the ￿rst order
condition (16).
Step 2. To complete the proof we need to show that there exists a pair (p￿;q￿) that solves
the ￿xed point de￿ned by q￿ = Q(p￿) and p￿ = P (q￿). Recall that Q(p) = F (B (p)=1 ￿ ￿),
where B (p) solves (16). Equation (7) is now replaced by
W = ￿R + ￿! [￿ (q) + q (1 ￿ ￿ (q))]W; (23)
34where ￿ (q) is the endogenous probability of full revelation and is equal to ￿I [￿ q + (1 ￿ ~ q)]=￿ y,
with ￿ q = F(￿ b=(1 ￿ ￿)), ~ q = F(~ b=(1 ￿ ￿)), and ~ b de￿ned above. Using equations (5) and (6),
￿ (q) can be implicitly de￿ned by
￿ (q) =   (￿ (q);q); (24)
where
  (￿ (q);q) ￿





￿f1 ￿ ￿! [￿ (q) + q (1 ￿ ￿ (q))]g
￿￿1
:
Combining (23) together with (5), (6), and (8), one obtains
P (q) =
(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿! [￿ (q) + q (1 ￿ ￿ (q))])
[1 ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ q)(1 + ￿ (q))]R
:
First, assumption A4 ensures that B (p) is uniquely de￿ned by equation (16) for any
p 2 (p;1=R) and the proof of Lemma 1 below shows that B0 (p) < 0. Then, Q(p) is
decreasing on the interval (p;1=R), given that it is immediate that Q0 (p) / B0 (p).
Next, we show that there is a unique ￿ (q) that solves equation (24). First, notice that
@  (￿ (q);q)=@￿ (q) < 0 and that   (0;q) > 0. Then, we only need to show that   (1;q) < 1,
where
  (1;q) =








This follows from the following chain of inequalities:
MI
￿ y
[1 + ￿ q ￿ ~ q] < 2
MI
￿ y




where the ￿rst one follows from the fact that ￿ q and ~ q are in [0;1], the second one comes from
assumption A1￿ , and the third one follows from the assumption that ￿R > ￿.
This implies that equation (24) has a unique interior solution for ￿ (q). Then there exists
a ￿xed point (q￿;p￿) with Q(1=R) < q￿ < Q(p), given that by assumption P (q1) < 1=R and
P (q2) > p.
Proof of Lemma 1
First, recall that B (p) ￿ argmaxb ￿(p;b). Assumption A4 implies that there exists a unique
B (p), that ￿b (p;B (p)) = 0, and ￿bb (p;B (p)) < 0. By total di⁄erentiating ￿b (p;B (p)) = 0,
35we obtain ￿bp (p;B (p)) + ￿bb (p;B (p))B0 (p) = 0, and then
B




Given that ￿bb (p;B (p)) < 0, to show that B0 (p) < 0, it is enough to show that ￿bp (p;B (p)) <
0. We can calculate that
￿bp (p;B (p)) = u
0 (ptbt+1 ￿ k) + ptbt+1u
00 (ptbt+1 ￿ k); (26)
and hence ￿bp (p;B (p)) < 0 given A3 and the assumption that k > 0, proving condition (i).











0 (p) ￿ 0:
proving condition (ii).
Finally, we need to prove condition (iii). Notice that d(pb)=dp = b+pB0 (p), where B0 (p)
satis￿es equation (25), with ￿bp (p;B (p)) given in equation (26) and, given assumption A4,
￿bb (p;B (p)) = p
2u












00 (a ￿ b)dF(a) < 0: (27)



























0 (ptbt+1 ￿ k)
)
:
Hence d(pb)=dp ￿ 0 i⁄the term in parenthesis is non-positive. We can show that this is the
case combining condition (27) and the fact that ￿cu00 (c)=u0 (c) ￿ 1, hence completing the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Take a pair (￿0;￿00) such that qB (￿0) < 1=2, qB (￿00) > 1=2, and qB (￿00) > 1=2. With a slight
abuse of notation de￿ne Q(p;￿), P L (q;￿), and P B (q;￿) the repayment map and the pricing
maps, in the limit and the benchmark equilibrium respectively, as a function of parameters








By construction, we know that P L (q;￿) > (<)P B (q;￿) for all q < (>)1=2. Moreover,
given that if there are multiple equilibria we always focus on the equilibrium with the highest
36price, it must be true that P L (Q(p);￿) < p for all p > p￿ (￿) and P B (Q(p);￿) < p for all
p > pB (￿). Also, we assume that an equilibrium exists for both ￿0 and ￿00 and hence, that
P L (~ q;￿) < 1=R and P L (￿ q) > p for ￿ = ￿0;￿00.
First, we show that if qB(￿0) < 1=2, then p￿(￿0) > pB(￿0). Assume by contradiction that













which is a contradiction given that by assumption qB (￿0) < 1=2. Second, we show that if
q￿(￿00) > 1=2, then p￿(￿00) < pB(￿00). Suppose by contradiction that pB(￿00) < p￿(￿00), then
P B (Q(p￿(￿00));￿0) < p￿(￿00) ￿ P L (Q(p￿(￿00));￿00), which is a contradiction given that by
assumption q￿ (￿00) > 1=2.
These two steps immediately imply that p￿(￿0) > pB(￿0) > 1=(2R) > pB(￿00) > p￿(￿00),
and hence p￿(￿00)￿p￿(￿0) > pB(￿00)￿pB(￿0). Moreover, for a given ￿, Lemma 1 implies that
Q(p;￿) is decreasing in p, and hence q￿(￿0) < qB(￿0) < 1=2 < qB(￿00) < q￿(￿00), implying
that q￿(￿00) ￿ q￿(￿0) > qB(￿00) ￿ qB(￿0). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5







￿! (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ q)) + (1 ￿ ￿q)
(1 ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ q))
2 < 0;
dP L (q;￿0)=dR > 0, and limR!1 dP L (q;￿)=dq = 0. Given that the equilibrium exists, it
must be that P (￿ q) > p and hence Q(p;￿0) > 1=2. This together with q￿ (￿0) < 1=2 implies
that there exists ^ R, such that if R00 > ^ R then q￿ (R00) > 1=2.
Claim 2. Again ￿x ￿0 = (￿0;R0). Recall that P B (1=2) = 1=(2R). With a slight abuse
of notation de￿ne Q(1=(2R);￿) = F(B (1=(2R);￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)j￿); where B (p;￿) is implicitly
de￿ned by ￿b (B (p;￿);p;￿) = 0
￿b (b;p;￿) ￿ pu





0 (a ￿ b)dF(aj￿):
Also, Q(1=(2R);￿) is continuos in ￿ and lim￿!￿1 F (aj￿) = 1 implies lim￿!￿1 Q(1=(2R);￿) =
1: Thus, there exists at least one ￿ such that Q(1=(2R);￿) = 1=2. If there are multiple ￿
such that Q(1=(2R);￿) = 1=2, call ^ ￿ the smallest one. If ￿ is su¢ ciently small so that
￿ < ^ ￿, this completes the proof.
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